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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the problem of income distribution is a basic issue in
economy in any country, theoretical study is not enough. Such trend
results from the fact the economic policy has concentrated on growth in
most countries. Joan Robinson indicates that this emphasis is the second
crisis in economic theory 1 .
But the problem of allocation was important in the ealier
development of economic theories. David Ricardo pointed that as society
was developing step by step, it was inevitable that outputs were
distributed to all social classes in the form of rents, profits, and wage.
He said that to decide the law of allocation was the principal problem of
distribution of political economy2 J . B. Clark raised the problem of
distribution most seriously. According to him, the most significant issue
in economics is to allocate wealth among competitors and social stability
depends on whether a fair allocation of output is achieved. 3
However , the importance of the distribution of income had been
veiled by growth-oriented strategies in recent days. Most less developed
countries (LDCs) place priorities on growth in their development plans.
LDCs contend that to make up for their underdevelopment in a short time,
they should choose an unbalanced development strategy. Their logic is
growth first, then distribution.
Currently many economists have studied the Korean economy as a
development model for LDCs. In addition, Korea is considered one of
countries which have a low inequity in income distribution/ Irma Adelman
indicates that Korea has undergone spectacular growth with an export
oriented industrialization strategy that resulted in improved income
distribution. 5 But Jaeeun Lee argues that the praises about wealth equity
in Korea is not due to the Korean government's policies but historical and
cultural factors. He insists that factors such as Japanese colonialism,
the Korean war, and parental concern about their children education
contributed to low inequality in the distribution of wealth
and income , while growth-oriented fiscal and monetary policies brought
about a monopolistic and oligapolistic market structure which distorted
income distribution. 6 He said that growth- oriented policies adopted by
Korean government for 20 years reduced the desirable effects of historical
factors on income distribution although the policies brought rapid
economic success to Korea.
Professor Adelman indicates that the distribution of income is
generally determined by three factors, that is, production function,
resource endowment, and institutional factors like economic policies. But
she explains that institutional factors are more important than the others
in determining income distribution. 7 This argument of Adelman is especially
true for Korea.
The experience Korea gained in economic development may be useful
to other LDCs , because most LDCs had the same historical sources, that is
to say, colonialism, land reform, strong military power, and growth-
oriented economic policies, etc. This paper will focus on finding out why
the favorable historical factors on income distribution have been veiled
by growth-oriented economic policies, thereby shedding some light on
development strategies and income distribution policies in LDCs. Korea
has experienced dramatic historical events since 1945, including the joy
of liberation after 40 years of colonialism and the subsequent frustration
of territorial division. Korea faced war five years after liberation. In
1961, the military took over government, changing the social hierarchy.
With this abrupt change, the structure of Korea's income distribution also
changed.
I will not discuss all the policies that affected income
distribution in Korea, but will focus on policies which had the greatest
role in determining present-day wealth allocation.
It is difficult to classify history into periods. But, it is
reasonable to classify periods by political stages which affects wealth
allocation. 6
This paper is organized as follows.
First, the paper will discuss the overview of the Korean economy to
understand its rapid economic growth.
Second, the paper will divide history into four periods, beginning
with colonial period. In each period, the paper mentions political,
social, and economic circumstances. Economic policies reflect the will of
the authorities who tried to solve major social problems.
Third, each policy mentioned will be discussed from the stand point
of income distribution instead of introducing them simply in chronological
order.
Fourth, this paper will concentrate on the fourth period, in
relation to adverse effects from growth-oriented economic policies. During
this period Korean economy developed rapidly. In this period, we can test
whether Simon Kuznets' theory is applicable to Korea. S. Kuznets argues
the relative gap between high- income and low- income classes worsens in the
beginning stage of economic development but improves in the later stage.
This relationship is the inverted U pattern of income inequality. Based
on economic performance during this period, Korea became a middle- income
country in the later 1980s.
But, ironically this period enlarged the gap between higher- income and
lower- income brackets in Korea
Fifth, in chapter V, this paper will conclude and suggest income
distribution policies appropriate to current Korean economic conditions.
Endnotes for Chapter I
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II. Overview of Korean Economy
Economic development in Korea has proceeded very rapidly for the
past two decades. Strictly speaking, the Korean government founded the
First Five-Year development plan for the first time in 1962. Since then,
the Korean economy has matured on the basis of successive development
plans led by the government. Of course, there were some development plans
before 1962. But they were intended to make best use of funds provided by
United States 'and United Nations' assistance. 1
In 1962, the Korean military government, which succeeded the
civilian government in 1961, tried to obtain popular political support
through economic development. Of course, the previous civilian government
also established several development plans, but the plans could not come
into effect, because the Korean government could not raise funds needed
to carry out the plans. At that time there was little accumulated capital
in Korea, with a low saving rate. Syngman Rhee , the former president of
civilian government, who was active in an independent movement during the
colonial period, did not like to borrow money from foreign countries,
because if Korea was in debt to foreign countries she would be
subordinated to them. 2 The plans at that time, therefore, could not
contribute to Korea's rapidly developing economy.
Chunghee Park, the former president of the military government, who
used to hierarchy of military organization, took priority over economic
development. He had been familiar with management through his life in
the military. He said that in human life economies precedes politics or
culture. 3 With his encouragement, foreign capital needed to encourage the
economic development plan came into Korea.
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The main strategy adopted by the government for economic development
was the unbalanced growth theory, because at that time there was little
capital and few skilled laborers. The economic plan emphasized the
manufacturing sector that could bring about more employment and
productivity than agriculture. Thanks to 20 years of the government -led
development plan, the Korean economy has grown from the typical economic
condition of underdeveloped countries to a stage of moderate
industrialization. (see tables 1 & 2)
.
Table 1, The Performance of Korean Economy
Unit 1961 1971 1979 1986
US $ 100
GNP Million
(Current Prices)
Per US $
Capita (Current Prices)
GNP
US $ 100
Exports Million
(Current Prices)
21
82
94
? 8 j
0.4 11.3
624
1,662
147
940
Annual
Average
2,286 Growth
Rate :
8.1%
347
Source : Economic Planning Board(EPB) , Korean Economic Indicators . Seoul
: 1986
Table 2. Sectoral Origin of GNP
( In Percentage )
1961 1971 1979 1984
Agr., For. & Fisheries 39.1 26.7 18.5 13.5
Min. 1.9 1.3 1.1 1.5
Manufacturing 13.6 22.2 27.6 28.4
Soc & Others 45.4 49.8 52.8 56.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source : EPB, op. cit., 1985
According to the sectoral origin of GNP, the share of the sector of
agriculture, forestry and fisheries decreased from 39.1 X in 1961 to 13.5
Z in 1984, while the share of the manufacturing sector increased from 13.6
% in 1961 to 28.4 % in 1984. In only two decades, Korea became, by third
world standards, a highly industrialized nation.
Rapid growth in this period brought about substantial betterment in
Korea's employment structure. The unemployment rate fell from 8.2 % in
1963 to 3.8 % in 1984, with the employment structure improving from a
traditional agricultural society to an industrialized society, as table
3 shows
.
Table 3. Employment Structure
Unit 1963 1971 1979 1984
Population Million 27.3 32.9 37.5 40.6
Labor Force " 8.3 10.5 14.2 15.0
(Economically Active Population)
Employment " 7.7 10.1 13.7 14.4
Employment Structure X
Agr. , For. & Fish. " 63.1 48.4 35.8 27.1
Min. & Mfg. " 8.7 10.8 23.7 24.2
Soc. & Other " 28.2 37.4 40.5 48.7
Unemployment Rate 8.2 4.5 3.8 3.8
Source : EPB, op. cit., 1985
Due to the improved economic performance, the quality of life was
greatly upgraded for the whole nation over the past two decades.
Indicators of a high standard of living opportunities for education, the
8
supply of piped water, better nutrition and general health of the people,
and the widespread supply of public goods and social overhead capital
facilities are visible. So, as for the economic growth in Korea during the
past 20 years, contrary to Robert McNamara's notion of economic growth in
developing countries,'1 economic growth had resulted in economic
development. 5
Table 4. Major Social Indicators
Unit 1962 1980
Middle School Enrollment Ratio
College Enrollment Ratio
Housing Investment/GNP
Piped Water Supply Ratio
Life Expectancy
Infant Mortality
Telephone Subscribers
Automobile Owners
Beneficiary Rate in Medical Insurance
Per capita Daily Calorie &
Protein Intake
X 42.3
*
96.8
II 21.2 27.2
***
" 1.6 3.1
- 18.2 59.0
years 52.4 65.9
per 1000 59.9 36.8
persons
"
5 89
.. 1.1 14.0
**
7. 8.8
*
24.0
calorie 2,079 2,485
Notes : * 1966, ** 1977, *** 1979
Source : Korean Economic Planning Board, Social Indicators in Korea . Seoul
1983
Endnotes for Chapter II
Korean Economic Planning Board(EPB) , The Economic Policies in
Developing Periods , Seoul : EPB, 1982, pp. 24. [in Korean]
Rhee thus devoted energy to political action rather than
administrative development and subserved economic goals to
integrative ones. For example, his anti- Japanese measures retarded
trade with a natural and traditional partner.
Sakong II and Jones, L. D. , Government . Business and
Entrepreneurship in economic Development j_ The Korea Case . Harvard
Council on East Asian Studies, 1980. pp. 42-43.
In 1972, Robert McNamara, the World Bank president, declared that
despite the relatively rapid economic growth of developing
countries, two thirds of the children are suffered from malnutrition
and a high rate of adult illiteracy exists in developing countries.
Nafziger, E. Wayne. The Economics of Developing Countries . Belmont,
California : Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1984, p. 12
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III. Historical Sources and Economic Policies of Income Distribution
As mentioned in Chapter I, historical factors had significant impact
on the income distribution of Korea until the early 1960s. Although the
Korean economy remained at the typical level of underdeveloped countries
in the early 1960s, she retained a low income inequality. In other words,
due to historical factors, Korea already maintained relative equity of
income distribution before she entered into a continuous high rate of
economic growth. Professor Harry T. Oshima indicates that South Korea,
with an even lower per capita income than Taiwan, has an index as low as
that of the U. S. and Japan. 1
Irma Adelman, on the other hand, discovered that the relative distribution
of all income in Korea remained essentially unchanged during the period
of rapid growth from 1964 to 1970. She also concluded, after various
cross-checks and sensitivity tests, that Korea's income distribution is
among the best in the developing world. 2 As professor Oshima indicates, the
situation of income distribution in any country in any specific period is
determined by several causes, conditions and their interaction. The
historical influences in Korea had shaped the structure of income
distribution fairly.
This paper will deal with historical sources chronologically from
the Japanese colonial period to the early 1960s. However, some evidence
related to the first part of this chapter dates back to the late 1930s
because of a lack of published data for the early 1940s, when most of the
resources was devoted to war efforts under Japanese rule.
1. The First Period. ( Colonial Period )
During the colonial period, Korea's economy was dominated by the
11
Japanese. The number of manufacturing corporations owned by Koreans in
1941 was about 41 percent of all the firms in that sector. But the scale
of these firms was small as compared to Japanese controlled firms. The
Japanese owned virtually all large-scale establishments and more or less
shared the small-scale-scale factories' ownership with Korean. The results
were that by 1941, the Japanese owned 59 percent of the manufacturing
firms, representing 91 percent of paid-in capital. 4 Due to large-scale
firms with modern facilities, a dualistic structure of economy occurs in
during the colonial period. This manufacturing dualism, as well as common
agricultural dualism of that period, minimized the spread of economic
growth, because dual economy incurs little interdependence among
industries. 5 Even in the agricultural sector, large-scale farmers,
especially those with more than 1,000 chungbo , were mostly Japanese or
Japanese dominated agricultural firms, farms and corporations as shown in
table 5
In connection with education, we have the same story as with the
economy. Japanese completely discriminated against Korea in providing the
opportunity of education. The enrollment rate in secondary school by
Japanese who lived in Korea reached 50 percent, while the rate for Koreans
of the same age was no more than 5 percent. As table 6 shows, the portion
of Japanese students in each level of school increases increases, as the
level of education heightens , although the Japanese were at that time a
minority in Korea. Japanese discrimination in education was strongly
prominent in admitting applicants to Kyungshung Imperial University, which
was the only university in Korea during the colonial period. 63 percent
of all enrolled students were Japanese, although the population of
12
Japanese was not more than 3 percent compared to the entire population of
Korea.
Table 5. Land Ownership of Big Farmers by Nationality
.
(1942)
or more
to
less than
Korean Japanese Others Total
Area Area Area Area
(Chungbo) % (Chungbo) X (Chungbo) X (Chungbo)
5- 10 Chungbo 342,666 93.8 18,786 5.2 3,730 1.0
10 -20
20 -50
50 -100
100 -500
500 -1,000
Over 1,000
214,577 89.2 21,530 9.0 4,348 1.8
168,116 82.0 27,749 13.5 9,230 4.5
83,562 72.2 21,201 18.3 11,059 9.5
81,588 54.0 36,199 24.0 33,339 22.0
15,779 35.0 13,213 29.3 16,061 35.7
4,794 3.8 23,904 19.1 96,600 77.1
365,182
240,455
205,095
115,822
151,126
45,053
125,298
Source : Bank of Chosun, Research Dept., Annual Economic Review . 1948,
p. 341
Notes : 1. large-scale farmers are defined to own 5 chungbo or more of
farm land
2. Others are owned by corporations
Table 6. Number of Students by Nationality in Each Level of School(1939)
( Person, % )
Total Korean Japanese
Primary School
Middle School
Vocational School
High School
University
(Kyungshung Univ.)
1,311,209 (100.0) 1,218,367 (92.9)
50,144 (100.0) 28,878 (57.6)
34,009 (100.0)
10,987 (100.0)
556 (100.0)
26,155 (76.9)
6,313 (57.5)
206 (37.1)
Total 1,427,196 (100.0) 1,293,637 (90.6)
92,842 ( 7.1)
21,266 (42.4)
7,854 (23.1)
4,674 (42.5)
350 (62.9)
133,559 ( 9.4)
Source : Choo Hackjung, Sources of Income Distribution in Korea . Seoul,
KDI p. 35
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Because of such Japanese education policies, Korea could not
accumulate human capital through education. Human resources with quality
education is an important source for a developing national economy.
Therefore, because most of the heads of Korean families who should
be in charge of economic activities were illiterate or graduated only from
primary schools . The distribution of human resources was equalized at a
low level. Hackjung Choo points out that it is an irony of history that
an unfair education policy by Japan contributed to the income distribution
in Korea. 6
2. The Second Period (1945-Before the Korean War)
2.1 The Character of this Period.
In 1945, Japan returned to her territory from Korea and after 3
years of U. S. military administration, Korea started as a newly emerging
nation in 1948. But, after the colonization of Japan, the liberation and
unexpected partition created extreme disorganization in every aspect of
Korean society.
Japanese -owned land properties were returned to the control of the
U. S. military government from 1945 to 1948 and then to that of the newly
independent Korean government after 1948. Consequently, the portion of
public holdings and ownership was very large as compared to total wealth
and to the wealth of the private sector as the ownership of Japanese
controlled properties was surrendered to the Korean authority in 1945.
In this respect, independent Korea has inherited a favorable basis
for a relatively equitable distribution of income. These government-owned
properties and land were redistributed and sold to farmers and the private
sector, gradually over the years to follow.
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During this period, it was partition that made things worse for
the Korean economy. At the conclusion of World War II, Korea was divided
between South Korea and North Korea. To understand the extreme economic
disorganization caused by the partition, it is necessary to look at
Korea's economic situation just before liberation. As table 7 shows, in
South Korea, rice paddies exceeded dry fields, a reverse of the situation
in North Korea.
The sectoral share of agriculture, forestry, and fishing was
greater in South Korea in 1940, while the North held a great share of
mining and manufacturing, especially in mining. In mineral resources, the
North's dominance was complete : the mining product of South Korea was
only a quarter of the total in 1940. In 1936, practically all the iron ore
and coal and more than 70 percent of the gold, silver, tungsten, and
graphite were produced in North Korea. In manufacturing, South Korea
produced a greater proportion of light- industry products, while the North
produced more heavy-and chemical -industry products.
As shown in table 7, about 85 percent of all textiles production and
89 percent of printing and publishing output came from plants located in
the South in 1939 . The South also produced the greater shares of
mchinery, wood products, processed foods, and miscellaneous manufactures.
However, 90 percent of metal products and 82 percent of chemicals were
produced in the North. The North also produced the greater share of
ceramics and gas electrical appliances. More critically, at the time of
partition, 92 percent of the total electrical power was generated in the
North. Thus, partition left South Korea with a great population and more
productive agricultural land, but without the most important mineral
15
resources and the country's power plants.
Table 7. Comparision of Some Economic Items between South Korea and North
Korea at the Time of Partition
Share of
theSouth
Item Unit South North All Korea in
Ko
All
rea(%)
Total Land km2 108,366 118,366 226,732 47.8
Population 1000 17,041 8,859 25,900 65.8
( 1944 ) Persons
Population Persons 158 75 114
Density Per km2
Arable Land V 22,300 24,175 46,475 48.1
( 1939 )
Rice Paddies - 13,293 5,684 18,977 70.0
Dry fields - 9,007 18,491 27,498 32.8
< Agricul tural Product >
Forestry Million Yen 109.7 103.3 213 51.5
(Current Price)
Fishery " 141.2 85.8 227 62.2
Mining " 62.0 194.0 256 24.2
Manufacturing » 324.3 371.7 696 46.6
Textiles " 171.0 30.4 201.4 84.9
Metal M 13.6 122.5 136.1 10.9
Machinery - 38.4 14.8 53.2 72.2
Ceramics " 12.1 31.2 43.3 27.9
Printing & » 17.2 2.2 19.4 89.0
Publishing
Processed » 213.6 114.8 328.4 65.1
Foods
Gas & Elec. " 11.1 19.4 30.5 36.4
Product.
Source : Kim, Kwangsuk and Roemer. Michael. Growth and Structur;al
Transformation. Harvard University Press. 1979, pp. 22 -24
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Although it is true that the partition of Korea hobbled the Korean
economy, the most significant impact of the division of Korea on the
economy, as well as on the society as a whole , was the Korean war itself
and the continuing military confrontation that has existed on the Korean
peninsula ever since. Aside from the damages of the war, continuing North-
South hostilities has led to large military budgets which have diverted
5 percent of the South 's GNP to mostly unproductive uses. 7
2.2 Land Reforms in 1947 and 1949.
In the midst of turmoil and confusion following liberation and partition,
there was a certain consensus that poverty in the rural sector was mainly
caused by the land system and that land reform was necessary to alleviate
the rural misery. The Korean government, which started as a newly emerging
nation, found it also necessary to reform the social structure to
eliminate remnants of the colonial period and to establish a fundamental
national order. 8
Russel King indicates that most land reforms occur in situations
where great disparities in wealth, income and power exist in agriculture. 9
He says that if the assumption that such inequalities act as a bottleneck
to development arouses sympathy, land reform can be successful. 10
The land reform in 1947 was performed under the U.S. military government.
The military government redistributed 324 thousand chungbo of vested
land. 11 Under the decree of the military authority, the value of land was
determined by three times that of the annual average production of a given
plot of land, which would be repaid in annual installments of 20 percent
of the yearly crops for 15 years. The second reform was made under the
newly organized Korean government in 1949.
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In this land reform, the major target was to redistribute tenanted land
exceeding 3 chungbo owned by large-scale farmers and absentee landlords.
It should be noted that the change in the repayment method for
redistributed land applied inclusively to redistributed vested land under
the U.S. Military government : 30 percent of average annual crops to be
paid for 5 consecutive years following the reform. The administration, in
turn, issued land value certificates in lieu of redistributed land
exceeding 3 chungbo to large-scale farmers and to absentee landlords.
2.3 The effects of land reforms
From the distributive equity point of view, land reform provided an
opportunity for forced savings for the low- income class, previously tenant
farmers, and destroyed the accumulated wealth of the upper- income class,
i.e., large-scale farmers and absentee landlords. Through land reform, the
land-to-tiller system was established. As a result of land reforms, as
shown in Tables 8 and 9, land distribution in Korea improved
significantly.
Table 8. Percentage and Accumulated Percentage of Farm Households and
Cultivated Area by Size(1945)
Size of Farm No. of Farm Household Size of Cultivated Area
Percentage Accumulated Percentage Accumulated
Percentage Percentage
10.4 10.4Less than 72.1 72.1
1 chungbo
1 - 5 23.8 95.9
5 - 10 2.8 98.7
40.4 50.4
23.2 73.6
More than
10 chungbo 1.3 100.0 26.4 100.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Source : Derived from the statistics in Korean Economic Yearbook . BOK,
1948, p. 1-32
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Table 9 . Percentage and Accumulated Percentage of Farm Households and
Cultivated Area by Size (1955)
Size of Farm No . of Farm Household
Percentage Accumulated
Percentage
Less than 19.0 19.0
3 tanbo
3 - 5 24.1 43.1
5 - 10 31.1 74.2
10 - 20 20.1 94.3
20 - 30 5.5 99.8
More than 0.2 100.0
30 tanbo
Size of Cultivated Area
Percentage Accumulated
Percentage
5.8
12.2 18.0
29.2 47.2
35.9 83.1
15.9 99.0
1.0 100.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Source : Derived from the Statistics in Agriculture and Forestry
Statistics Yearbook . MAF, pp. 26-27
Note : One tanbo is one tenth of a chungbo.
Although Korea's land reform that tried to solve tenure problems
faced some obstacles such as the Korean War and lack of finance, it had
several positive effects. Centuries-old landlordism almost disappeared,
and for the first time farmers enjoyed the right of democracy and
ownership. Land reform undoubtedly reduced the feeling of personal
subordination and increased independence and individualism. Also
,
agricultural output increased greatly, except during the Korean war, with
an improved productivity.
2.4 Disposal of Vested Properties
As noted earlier, properties of Japanese-controlled corporations,
as well as Japanese -owned land, were returned to public ownership in 1945.
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As shown in Table 10, there were about 3,500 firms recorded as vested to
public ownership, of which about 2,500 were manufacturing firms. In
addition, there were numerous houses and buildings where Japanese resided
in Korea. All these properties were managed by a special government
agency and were gradually relinquished to the private sector. Despite the
fact that these properties were sold, in many cases below their market
value under severe inflation in pre-and post-Korean war years, revenues
resulting from property disposals, rentals and others were quite
significant sums, fluctuating from 1.3 X of general government revenue in
1949 to 4.6% in 1951.
Table 10. Results of the Survey on Vested Properties (1948)
Number of Entities
108
74
316
2,469
61
81
23
313
110
Agriculture and Forestry
Fishery
Mining
Manufac tur ing
Construction
Transportation & Storage
Banking and Insurance
Retail and Wholesale
Miscellaneous
Dissolved
Location Unidentified
Impossible to Survey
Total Surveyed 3,555
826
2,406
94
Grand Total
Source : The Bank of Korea, Annual Economic Review . 1949, p. IV-154
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Hackjung Choo indicates that from a distributive point of view, what
can be safely asserted is that Korean asset distribution during the post-
world war years was somewhat unique in the sense that most of the tangible
assets were under the control of the public sector because the government
took care of the Japanese properties. He suggests that such an asset
distribution, including land, would have affected income distribution in
favor of relative equity. 12
3. The Third Period (The Korean War - 1961)
During this period, a policy for economic development, in the true
sense of the word, did not exist. Most Korean people were in absolute
poverty. No serious effort was made by the government to accomplish
economic development. Instead, the government focused its economic policy
on maximizing foreign assistance to overcome absolute poverty.
3.1 The character of this period
Table 11, shown below, indicates that the situation of Korean economy
during this period was the typical model of underdeveloped countries. The
vicious circle of poverty existed in Korea at that time. That is, because
the incomes of people were very low, they could not save much money, which
induced low investment rates. The low investment rates brought about low
product which resulted in low income. Thus, the standard of living in
Korea did not improve conspicuously from the situation in 1954 just after
the Korean war. Although almost ten years had passed since the end of the
war, the Korean national economy, as shown in Table 12, was still mainly
dependent on foreign aid.
The baby boom after the war increased the growth rate of population
to more than 3 percent. This population growth restricted the annual
21
growth rate of GNP to 4.4 percent and the per capita average had remained
at about $ 80 for almost 10 years. Therefore, Korea was one of the poorest
among the East and South East Asian countries. 13 As for the industrial
structure, Korea exhibited the typical preindustrialized type, with the
agricultural sector dominating. There was much disguised unemployment in
rural areas. Because of the scantiness of capital, laborers who graduated
from primary school could not get jobs in urban areas. In the case of
international trade, Korea suffered from a continuous deficit in the
balance of payments. The deficit was made up by foreign assistance, equal
to nearly 80 percent of the total fixed capital formation, and to 8
percent of GNP. 1 *
Table 11. The Vicious Circle of Poverty
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 '54-'61
Annual GNP
Growth Rate 5.5 5.4 0.4 7.7 5.2 3.9 1.9 4.8 4.4
Per-Capita
GNP ($) 70 66 66 74 81 83 81 83
Investment
Ratio 11.6 11.9 9.5 15.3 13.0 10.7 10.9 13.1 12.0
Domestic
Savings 6.4 4.9 1.3 5.5 5.0 3.9 1.4 3.9 3.7
Ratio
Source : EPB, Handbook of Korean Economy . Seoul, 1980, p. 572
Table 12. Foreign Aid, Exports & Imports ( in million U.S. $ )
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 '54-'61
Foreign 154 237 327 383 321 222 245 199 2,068
Aid
Exports 24 18 25 22 17 20 33 41 200
Imports 243 341 386 442 378 304 344 316 2,754
Source : EPB, Handbook of Korean Economy
,
Seoul, p. 574
2 2
3.2 The effect of the Korean War on Income Distribution
The Korean war had a tremendous impact on the equity of income
distribution. During the war, civilian casualties approached one million,
including those killed, wounded and missing. 15 Non-military war damage to
buildings and structures, equipment, furniture and other movable assets
was estimated at 41.2 billion won at July 1953 market prices, that is,
U.S. $ 3.1 billion at the implicit exchange rate for 1953. According to
the Nathan Associates, 16 the civilian war damages were equivalent to two
years' GNP for 1952 and 1953 at $ 1,553 million.
According to the estimates made by the Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, war damage to manufacturing facilities was equal to 42 to 44
percent of the prewar facilities. Textiles, shipbuilding, printing and
publishing, and other industries located around Seoul sustained
particularly heavy damage. Damage to productive facilities and the
interruption of domestic production and imports touched off wild inflation
and a decline in already low standards of living. The national urban
retail price index was 197.8 in 1949(1947-100). It more than doubled
between June and September of 1950 and then shot up to 2,128.5 in 1951,
5,243 in 1952 and 7,618 in 1953. 17 Futhermore , inflation did not end with
the 1953 armistice.
However, the tragedy of the Korean war and its resulting damage
further flattened the variance and skewed wealth distribution within the
private sector. To what extent such damages affected asset distribution
of the private sector is, of course, unknown without a size distribution
of assets, But, I can say that such phenomena to be mentioned as follows
contributed to the income distribution.
2 3
First, the properties of the-upper income class were lost or damaged
because of the war. Of course, the lower classes were not immune to such
destruction either. But, we can suspect that damage was especially heavy
in the upper class of asset distribution.
Second, especially, during the year of the war and the year
immediately following the war, a terms of trade favored agricultural
commodities. Because there was a scarcity of food and the majority of
urban residents were suffering from the loss of jobs, assets of urban
residents were redistributed to farmers in exchange for low quality
foodstuffs, since during the war, urban residents were more vulnerable in
terms of securing the basic needs for survival. So, the urban rich would
dispose of valuables in exchange for overvalued food and substitutes. Such
a behavior pattern would certainly shift the distribution of assets in
favor of relative equity.
In this process, large-scale farmers had been the most likely
beneficiaries. But, as noted, as the results of land reforms, there were
no farmers with sizable holdings. Thus, urban to rural redistribution of
tangible assets had occurred widely, which had modified the distribution
of tangible assets and that of income for the following years.
During this period, there were also tremendous profiteering
opportunities wartime for business men in the southeastern region that was
saved from destruction. It is not a mere accidents that many of the
prominent Korean industrialists and business men of today originally came
from this region.
2U
3.3 The Expansion of Education
It is also important to note that traditionally, the Korean
people have been highly concerned with educating their children under the
influence of Confucianism. And thanks to the fact that the constitution
of the newly formed Korean government ordered that all parents should
enroll their children in primary schools the literacy rate of Korea rose
from 30 percent to over 80 percent between 1953 and 1963. Universal
primary education became a coerced rule in the countryside as well as in
cities. Secondary and higher education also grew rapidly, to the point
that by 1964 the country, with per capita income of about $ 100, had one
in every 280 citizens in college.
Such an expansion of education was due to the eager desire of parents who
did not get enough education and, therefore, could not get high-salaried
jobs, since most people did not receive sufficient education due to
Japan's discriminative policy in Korea during the colonial period. Korean
parents at that time, accordingly, wanted their children to enter
secondary school and higher school. Thus, the number of elementary
students increased by 2 . 7 times from the time of liberation to the early
1960s. The number of secondary students increased by 9
.
5 times and higher
students by 12.9 times during the same period. 18 Fredrich H. Harbinson and
Charles A. Mayers classified the education level of Korea in 1960 as that
of semiadvanced countries, with the consideration of several factors such
as GNP, the population in agricultural sector, the enrollment rate of each
level of school, the cost of education, and the eagerness for education. 19
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IV. Some Sources of Income Distribution in Economic Policies
(The Fourth Period : 1962-present)
1. The Character of This Period
The Korean economy achieved rapid growth, and the structure of
income distribution in Korea was shaped during this period.
To understand the economic policy enforced during this period, we
should pay attention to the political transition from civilian government
to military government. The military government which overthrew the former
civilian government by military force tried to obtain authority from
economic development, because at that time most people, espt ially those
in rural areas, were still under the absolute poverty line.
As soon as the military leaders took political power, they established the
Korean Economic Planning Board (EPB) which is still mainly responsible for
the planning and operating of Korean economic policy. The head of the EPB
was given the title of deputy prime minister. This elevated position for
the chief of the national planning agency signified the seriousness of the
regime's planning effort and was necessary to coordinate and control
conflicts among the various economic ministries. L. P. Jones indicates
that the establishment of EPB was an institutional innovation in relation
to strategy for economic development. 1
However, at the outset of this period, there were not many
accumulated resources. Thus, the government preferentially aided the light
manufacturing industry, which created many employment opportunities and
gave Korea a comparative advantage over other countries, in such areas as
textiles, plywood, electrical goods, and footwears. After the industries
reached a sustained growth orbit, the government shifted investment
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priority from light manufacturing industries to the industries with large
import substitution efforts, such as fertilizers, oil refining, cement and
then to the integrated iron and steel mills and petro- chemical plants.
At that time, the basic position of the government on income
distribution policy was that when wealth was accumulated through economic
growth, the benefits of economic growth could spread to the lower income
class gradually. But, although the growth-oriented economic policy had
established rapid economic growth during this period, the policies
weakened the favorable effects that stemmed from historical sources on
income distribution.
2. Economic Measures and Policies in Relation to Income Distribution
The military government took some coercive actions connected with
the equity of income distribution. The measures mentioned here could not
be feasible under a civilian administration because the actions are
radical and unfavorable to the established ruling class. The government's
arrangement of usurious loans in rural areas, monetary reforms, and
confiscation of illegally accumulated wealth were based on political
reasons, not purely economic ones. The leaders of the military government
did their best to get political support from the middle class in Korean
society
.
2.1. The Arrangement of Usurious Loan in Rural Areas
In the early 1960s, the problem of usurious loans which occurred in
unorganized money markets was very significant. Traditionally, in Korea,
the demand for loan funds is greater than the supply of loanable funds
.
So, usurious loans came to exist, especially, in rural areas where it was
not easy for people to access to public financial systems.
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Most of the rural population, therefore, suffered from the heavy burden
of paying high interest rates generated from usurious loans. At the end
of 1960, interests derived from the loans comprised 50 or 100 percent of
real income in rural areas. Historically, this long-standing factor was
generally recognized as one of the basic obstacles to rural development
and to improving the share of farm disposable income.
As shown in Table 13, the extent of usurious debt reported under the
special law for arranging usurious loans, was 4,807.2 million won at the
end of 1962. Of this amount, 2,948.4 million won or 61.3 percent of the
reported debt was judged to be qualified. Allowing for the exception under
the law, 2 the portion on which the equivalent debenture was issued to
creditors was 2,661.5 million won. This sum was, under normal conditions,
paid back by the debtors in four-year installment payments, following a
year of grace period at the annual interest rate of 20 percent.
This measure had direct redistributive effects on asset holdings in
favor of the assetless at significant losses to the creditors by doubling
wholesale prices during the period 1961 to 1966.
Table 13. The number of Cases Rural Usurious Debt, Reported, Qualified and
Settled
No. of Cases Total Amount
Reported 1,171,131 4,807,826
Qualified 890,391 2,948,779
Settled 781 , 742 2,661, 544
Source : Choo, Hakjung, Sources of Income Distribution in Koreaf II) . Seoul
: KDI Press, 1982, p. 60
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2.2. Monetary Reforms
The military government carried out monetary reforms in June 1962. 3
They thought the unequal possession of liquidity was one of the reasons
that brought about unequal income distribution. Of course, money reforms
without resorting to confiscation of liquidity exceeding an upper limit,
do not extensively alter the distribution of assets.
But, the reported cash holdings by different groups reveal, to some
extent, an approximate income distribution, if there is a relation between
cash holdings and asset and income distribution. Through the monetary
reforms, Table 14 shows that about 10 percent of rich households possessed
about 50 percent of cash circulated at that time. And less than 1 percent
of rich families held about 20 percent of the liquidity.
Although this phenomena did not reflect directly the distribution
of wealth, because currency is one form of financial assets, this data is
enough for us to determine that the concentration of wealth is an
important problem to deal with in enforcing an income distribution policy.
The government devaluated the money from 10 whan to 1 won. They
allowed people to convert up to 30,000 whan to new won freely. But, a
progressive scheme of restricted conversion was applied to different
levels of cash holdings above the unrestricted conclusion.
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No. of % Amount %
Households
3,273,106 89 .00 74 ,084,316 49 96
215,064 5 85 14 ,600,672 9 ,85
101,651 2 .76 14 ,313,755 9 ,65
62,779 1 .71 19 ,189,753 12 .94
17,945 .49 12 ,045,119 8 .12
6.636 18 10 ,958,186. 7 39
271 .01 1 ,734,856 1 17
69 - 1 ,209,392 82
1 . 143,300 10
Table 14. Cash Distribution Among Households (June, 1962)
Less than 50 Thousand Whan
Less than 100 Thousand Whan
Less than 200 Thousand Whan
Less than 500 Thousand Whan
Less than 1 Million Whan
Less than 5 Million Whan
Less than 10 Million Whan
Less than 50 Million Whan
More than 100 Million Whan
Total 3,677,522 100.00 148,279,394 100.00
Source : Bank of Korea, Report on Emergency Monetary Measures , June 1962
2.3. Confiscation of Illegally Accumulated Wealth
The third epochal measure taken by the military government was the
confiscation of illegally accumulated wealth. At that time, broadly
defined, illegally accumulated wealthes were as follows 4 ;
(1) Tax evasion, tax exemption and tax reduction of an undue nature
(2) Profiteering from disposal of public and vested properties ;
(3) Bravely to politicians, official and bankers
;
(4) Preferential treatment in smuggling, capital flight and other
special interest ; and
(5) Monopoly rights
.
On the basis of criteria mentioned above, 3,995 million won was paid in
the form of cash, commercial bank stock, and other properties by some high
income classes
. The confiscation of illegally accumulated wealth was a
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fatal blow to some of the accused who were then excluded from the list of
Korean big businesses after this incident.
In addition, the settlement of levies and penalties in the form of
commercial bank stocks put all the commercial banks under government
control from that time. In relation to the confiscation measure, Leroy P.
Jones indicates that because the funds gained from the confiscation of
illegally accumulated wealth returned to the public sector, the portion
of public enterprise as a percentage of GDP reached 6.5 percent and even
to 12.6 percent without any consideration of the agricultural sector. 5
The transfer to the government of so much accumulated wealth had a
substantial influence on future income distribution via wealth
redistribution, at least through 1963.
First, because the highest income classes should be divested of
their wealth, including their owned firms and the confiscated wealth
belonging to the public sector, the properties of highest income were
reduced to a significant extent.
Second, the public sector, in other words public corporations, grew
larger as compared with Korean economy at that time. And the commercial
banks, which had the largest portion among the Korean financial market,
had become public corporations. Thus, the factor of economic
concentration, which was derived from the combination between financial
capital and industrial capital, has been eliminated.
The measures mentioned above were intended to bring about a redistribution
of wealth in a short time. So, the measures involved political reasons
rather than economic reasons, while the policies to be introduced from
this time are designed to make a target of equity of income allocation in
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the long term. These policies were established, based on the strategies
of several Five-Year development plans. However, because the Korean
government adopted an unbalanced growth strategies due to the restraints
of capitals and skills, some economic policies had adverse effects to
income distribution policies.
2.4. Employment Creation
Rapid growth in the Korean economy has been characterized by labor-
intensive export-oriented growth. The accelerating of rate growth in each
successive five-year plan provided many job opportunities to the
unemployed. There is no more effective income distribution policy than
giving the poor stable jobs.
In the 1960s, the strategy that placed an emphasis on labor
intensive manufacturers in the field of export-oriented industry yielded
many jobs. Table 15 shows how rapidly the labor intensive manufacturers
grew in the 1960s. In Table 15, we can see the extent of job creation
indirectly.
Table 15. Industrial Employment in Major Light Industry
1961 (A) 1966 1971 (B) B/A
Plywood 1,217 29,880 124,275 102.1
Textile & Yarn 857 47,333 137,834 160.8
Electrical Machinery
Apparatus & Appliances 107 5,101 68,486 646.1
Clothing 111 33,387 304,265 271.8
Footwear 18 5,467 37,436 2079.8
Source : EPB. Handbook of Korean Economv. S eoul, 1980, p. 572
As shown in Table 15, in 1966, when the first five-year development
was finished, thanks to the government- led export-oriented policy, labor
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intensive- Industries had grown very rapidly. Compared with 1960,
the footwear industry grew by 303 times for a five year period. And in
1971, when the second five-year economic development plan ended, the
manufacturing industries mentioned above, which were major industries at
that time, thrived on a large scale. In particular, the footwear
industries grew by 2,080 times. As a result, by the early 1970s, Korea
ceased to be labor surplus economy. 6
In the 1960s, there were many laborers educated in primary schools
in the rural areas because Korea designated primary education as
compulsory from the beginning of the foundation of Korean government. The
primary educated remained as disguised unemployed in the rural areas until
they were hired through the development plan led by government. Daemo, Kim
points out in his study that export expansion in labor-intensive
industries contributed to increased employment of those who graduated from
lower education schools instead of those who graduated from higher
education schools. 7 The increase in employment had positive effects on
income distribution, whereas there were good results on the one hand as
shown in Table 15, unwelcome problems took place on the other hand. Owing
to the unbalanced growth strategy, the gap between the sectors began to
widen, (see Table 16)
Table 16 . Growth Rate by Industry (1962-1981)
GNP Manu-
facturing
Mining &
Quarring
Const- Trans. Storage Agri . Forest,
ruction & Communication & Fishery
8.1 16.5 6.92 14.4 17.0 3.9
Source : EPB, Major Statistics of Korean Economy . 1982, p . 24
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2.5 Tax Policy
The tax system of that period aimed to support rapid economic growth
through tax exemption and a preferential tax for selected key, import -
substitution and export-expansion industries. Tax policy is one of the
sources of an unequal income distribution in Korea. Generally, in getting
revenues, LDCs depend largely on indirect tax instead of on direct tax,
regardless of its regressiveness
. In LDCs, taxes are the major source
of financial resources for public expenditures, because Korea, like most
LDCs, relies disproportionately on indirect taxes, which are less elastic
than direct taxes. 8
In Korea, direct taxes, including the income tax, provided only about
40 percent of the total government revenue after 1975. There has been no
tendency for the percentage to rise. Besides, there is much undertaxation
of the rural areas which is a progressive element, since the rural sector
is poorer than its urban counterpart. 9
Table 17. The Ratio of Direct and Indirect Taxes to GNP
Year Direct Tax Indirect Tax
1962 2.1 3.7
1966 5.2 5.3
1972 4.4 4.6
1975 3.9 5.8
1977 3.6 6.0
1980 3.6 6.1
Source : EPB, Handbook of Korean Economy
. 1980, p. 46
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Table 17 shows that the gap between the direct tax and the indirect
tax was small, 1966-1972, even though the share of indirect tax was larger
than that of the direct tax. But, the gap gradually increased, especially
after the government introduced the VAT (value-added- tax) to the Korean
tax system.
In tax policy, the more decisive factor that caused income
inequality was the tax reduction and exemption system. Since the tax
reform of 1961, the government has adopted various kinds of tax reduction
and exemptions to promote saving and investment needed to build up key
industries and to improve the balance of international payments. According
to tax policy, people could get tax exemption and reduction from the
following: 10
(1) Saving ;
(2) The profit gained from saving (interest, dividend)
;
(3) Capital gains from the trade of securities
;
(4) Reserved profits in corporation
;
(5) Accelerated depreciation
;
(6) Investment in the new field ;
(7) Profits gained from exports ; and
(8) Major industry which contributed to economic development
The ratio of the amount of tax reduction and exemption to total amount of
internal tax increased to 56.9 percent in 1977. With this tax system, the
large corporation, which participated in export oriented industry,
accumulated much capital and held monopoly market power under the favor
of government, while the small firms did not receive benefits from the
economic growth. Some of the large corporations exploited monopoly power
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in pricing and purchasing real assets such as land and building instead
of reinvestment in industry with accumulated profits. In addition, since
they expected tax reduction and exemption in their businesses, they
managed their businesses inefficiently.
2.6 Expenditure Policy
With the consideration of expenditure policy, we can understand
the distortion of tax policy from the viewpoint of income distribution
policy. Most of the revenues in the general account were gained from taxes
as shown in Tables 18 & 19
.
Table 18 . Revenues of General Account by Sector & Source
Tax Monopoly Non- Others
Year Total Internal Customs Profit Tax
'
rax Duties Revenues
1962 100 30.3 23.1 7.2 4.5 7.3 57.9
1966 100 57.0 45.5 11.5 4.9 7.2 31.0
1970 100 75.1 63.7 11.4 6.8 4.9 13.3
1974 100 77.0 65.9 11.1 8.3 5.7 9.0
1978 100 83.5 67.5 16.0 6.9 7.4 2.2
1980 100 79.8 68.3 11.5 7.7 9.6 2.9
1981 100 81.i5 69.8 11.8 8.5 3.6 6.3
Source : EPB, Maior Statistics of Korean Economv. 1982. p . 192
As shown in Table 19, the portion of indirect tax in tax
revenues grew as the burden rate of tax became larger. Since indirect
taxes tend to be regressive, tax policy did not contribute to promoting
equality in income distribution.
3 8
Table 19. Annual Ratio of Tax Burden to GNP and Breakdown of Annual Tax
Revenues
Burden Total
Breakdown of Annual Tax Revenues
Year Direct Indirect Customs Defense Others
Rate Tax Tax Duties Tax
1962 10.6 100.0 33.4 39.4 23.9 3.3
1966 10.7 100.0 46.9 30.2 20.1 2.8
1970 14.9 100.0 50.7 33.0 15.2 1.1
1974 14.0 100.0 48.6 33.9 15.0 2.5
1978 18.1 100.0 25.0 41.0 19.2 14.0 0.8
1980 19.4 100.0 22.3 45.4 14.5 16.2 1.6
1981 19.1 100.0 21.8 47.2 14.5 15.7 0.8
Source : EPB, Maior Statistics of Korean Economv, 1982
,
p. 179
Table 20. Government Expenditure Ratio for Selected Years
( as Percentage of GNP )
Government Expenditure
on
1962 1972 1976 1980
Education
Health
Welfare 6i Social
Security
Housing & Community
Development
Transport , Communication
Water, Road, Water Way
Fire Protection
3.2 3.8 3.7 4.6
0.6 0.2 0.3 0.5
1.1 1.0 0.8 1.3
0.1
1.9
0.1
2.9
0.4
3.2 2.5
Defense, General Administration &
Justice Police
6.8 8.3 9. 5
Other & Economic Activity
Total
7.7
24.5
5.7
20.5
4.3
21.0
5.9
24.9
Source : Chung, Changkun, Income Distribution and Economic Growth .
Master Report 1986, p. 52
39
Furthermore, with the consideration of expenditure policy, we can
understand how tax policy contributed to inequality as mentioned above.
Table 20 shows that the government used only a small percentage of its
expenditure on health, social security, welfare, and housing. Therefore,
the expenditure policy did not contribute to equality in Korea's income
distribution.
2.7 Monetary Policy
< Supply of Money >
No other economic policy had a more adverse effect than monetary
policy on income distribution. Monetary policy focuses on the supply of
money and interest rate. In Korea, monetary policy had substantial impact
on income distribution due to inflation, which was caused by the excessive
money supply. Of course, an excessive money supply was not the only reason
for high inflation. 11 But, in Korea, the character of the inflation was
demand-pull inflation originating from an excessive money supply. 12 The
model designed by Kwangsuk Kim also indicates that an expansion of money
supply exceeding the demand for real money is the most direct cause of
inflation. 13 From 1962 to 1980, an average annual rate of increase in the
money supply (M2 : Currency in circulation, demand deposits, and time and
saving deposit) was 39 percent. During the same period, the average
inflation rate was 16 percent. 14 The Korean people were used to a high rate
of inflation, having suffered from chronic inflation with double digit
rates , since the establishment of the post-colonial government
.
Therefore, under high and persistent inflation, households sought to
protect themselves against inflation by converting their savings into
real assets through purchasing housing, land, and buildings. That is,
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inflation creates a bias toward short-lived projects, luxurious houses,
and land speculation. Due to real estate speculation, the prices of
housing and land rose 84 times between 1964 and 1976 compared to the price
of consumer goods which rose only 6 times. 15 The high- income classes who
have real assets benefited from high persistent inflation, while the low
income classes, whose main income source was wages, suffered from soaring
prices. The reason is that the increase in the rate of inflation exceeds
that of wages. The lower class especially bore the heavy rental rate,
because of a chronic shortage of housing in Korea. Among several social
indicators, housing ownership expenditure rates as total consumption
expenditures show that the lower- income class faces difficulty in the
housing sector. Table 21 indicates that the housing ownership rate
declined from 78.2 percent in 1966 to 58.4 percent in 1980. Table 22
implies that for the lower class housing expenditures became an
increasingly heavy burden over time. In Korea, the rental rate is
sensitive to inflation because real assets are treated as a means for
enlarging wealth speculation. In brief, the share of wage income in
proportion to the total national income gradually fell in the period of
strong inflation, while the share of non-agricultural business income
showed an opposite movement. Income was redistributed from wage earners
to capitalists in Korea when inflation suddenly soared.
Table 21. Housing Ownership Rate (%)
Year Ownership Rate
1966 78.2
1970 68.2
1975 63.1
1980 58.4
Source : EPB, Social Indicators in Korea . 1983, p. 214
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Table 22. : Ratio of Household Housing Expenditure to Total Consumption
Expenditure
Year Urban Household Farm Household
Hous ing Housing Housing Housing
Expenditure Rate Expenditure Rate
1966 29,160 17.9 4,454 4.0
1969 57 , 840 18.5 7,373 4.3
1972 90,240 19.5 17,651 5.7
1975 137,040 17.5 42,847 7.0
1978 331,080 21.6 114,183 8.6
1981 701,712 23.0 167,342 6.3
Source : EPB. Social Indicators in Korea. 1983. p. 217
< Interest Rate >
Monetary policy affects income distribution through the interest
rate. Traditionally, in Korea the amount of demand for money is greater
than the amount of supply. According to economic theory, interest rates
should increase from an excess demand for money. But, because the
government controls the financial market, the interest rate was far below
the equilibrium rate. So to obtain a bank loan was a significant
advantage. Thus large corporations which provided collateral had access
to the public market, while small-and medium-sized corporations, which
could not obtain a mortgage, had to use the private financial market,
where the interest rate is much higher than public the financial market.
Therefore, there were a large number of unorganized markets. When the
government moved to reduce curb -market loans in the summer of 1972, 356
billion won in private loans were reported to the authorities.
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The amount was equivalent to the total lending by all special banks at
that time. 16 In connection with the interest rate in the public financial
market, we should discuss the problems of policy credit. Policy credit
supported export-oriented industry such as textiles, footwear and
electronics in the 1960s, and chemical, engineering, ship building, and
heavy machinery in 1970s. As shown in Table 23, the interest rate for
using this credit is exceptionally low. In 1967, the interest rates of
loan for export promotion was only 6 percent, while the rate of general
commercial bank loan was 26 percent. In 1980, although the rate for the
export industry rose to 8 percent, the rate was still far lower than 18
percent of the general commercial bank loan. Only large-scale enterprises
and firms producing for export could use this favorable financial system.
Besides, some of large enterprises which borrowed the exceptional
credit bought lands and buildings with the special loans , that were not
related to their business, to protect against inflation. The amount of
policy credit provided by all the bank institutions reached one time more
than 50 to 60 percent of the total bank credits
.
17 Thus , under preferential
lower interest rates in the money market, economic concentration began to
take place around the big business company which participated in exports.
Table 23. Comparison between Policy Credit, Bank Loan and Inflation Rate
Year Loan for Export. General Bank Loan Inflation Rate
1967 6.0 26.0 10.8
1970 6.0 22.0 15.9
1976 7.0 15.5 15.3
1980 8.0 18.0 28.7
Source : EPB, Korean Economic Indicators . Seoul, 1985, p. 25
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2.8 Education Policy
Education mainly improves human resources to promote productivity
and economic growth. Education contributes to national economic progress:
(1) by improving the quality of labor through promoting skills, efficiency
and work knowledge; (2) by increasing labor mobility to promote division
of labor and to increase the labor force participation rate; and (3) by
increasing scientific and technical knowledge to promote invention,
discovery and swift adaptation. 18
As for the Korean economy, D. C. Cole and P. N. Lymann indicate that
the availability of abundant human resources is one of the major factors
of economic growth. In the beginning period of economic development, the
general demand for labor is for workers with primary education. At that
time, Korea placed emphasis on labor intensive industries, which demanded
many less skilled laborers. Therefore, the concentrated investment of the
1950s in primary school contributed to the economic development of earlier
periods and the increased equality in income distribution. So the view
that primary education is the most effective human investment for
overcoming absolute poverty and for reducing income inequality is
appropriate to the Korean economy. 19 With this intensive investments in
education in 1950s and the early 1960s, Korea developed relatively
abundant human resources. The population density of Korea is comparable
to that of the Netherlands and China, but there are many positive
attributes credited to Korean workers , such as adaptability, diligence and
manual dexterity.
But, from the third five-year economic development plan in the early
1970s, the industrial structure shifted from light industry to heavy,
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chemical, and electrical-engineering industry. These industries
needed highly-skilled labor instead of unskilled labor. However, after the
early 1970s, government spending on education gradually dropped.
Educational expenditures decreased from 2.8 percent of GNP in 1971 to 2 . 2
percent in 1975. Besides the government leaves a large portion of higher
school to private institutions. Because the private school can not get
financial assistance from the government, the tuition and fees of private
colleges are very expensive. So many students who graduated from secondary
school could not receive higher education because of financial reasons.
In 1975, only about 10 percent of total high school students entered
college. This phenomena implied that mainly those from middle or high
income classes, due to the educational cost, have a chance to obtain
higher education. Consequently the highly- skilled intensive jobs, whose
salary is high compared to that of unskilled jobs, is rarely accessible
to students from a poor family, who cannot afford university. As Table 24
shows, the wage gap caused by education attainment has increased over
time. The fact that we should not miss is that the salary gap between the
high school graduate and the college graduate became greater, whereas the
gap between middle school graduates and high school graduates was almost
constant during the same period. The person who does not receive higher
education cannot easily obtain management -level position. Table 24
indicates the extent to which education brings about a wage gap in jobs.
In Korean society, high school graduates generally work as sales persons,
production workers and farmers, while college graduates have jobs as
professional , technical , and managerial workers . There is a considerable
wage gap between white-collar workers and blue-collar workers in Korea.
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In Korea, school attainment is generally overvalued as a tool for
screening job applicants.
Table 24. Wages Levels by Education Level
(won, %)
Year Middle School
Graduate
Level
High School
Graduate
Level
Junior College
Graduate
Level
College
Graduate
Level
1972 17,009 70
1974 26,273 64
1976 43,226 59
1978 72,947 62
1980 124,435 69
27,939 100 - 47,439 175
41,069 100 - 81.439 198
73,144 100 106,256 145 167,982 230
116,898 100 174,469 149 269,998 231
180,919 100 264,762 146 413,318 228
Source : EPB, Social Indicators in Korea . 1983, p. 162
Table 25. Wages by Occupations
(won)
All Pro. Tech.
Year Workers Workers
Managerial
Workers
Sales Farmers Production
Workers Fishery Workers
1971 22,241 40,362
1972 22,834 44,258
1973 27,299 51,202
1974 36,064 59,692
1975 46,654 92,400
1976 64,308 136,004
1977 77,375 157,230
1978 104,132 211,487
1979 146,442 285,504
60 ,792 20 ,242 15 ,445 17,516
67 ,755 24 ,113 17 ,031 18,386
83 ,486 31 ,514 18 ,517 20,729
98 ,511 34 ,845 23 ,497 28,874
159 ,399 42 964 30 ,332 34,820
220 ,958 52 319 40 ,123 46,639
254 ,301 75 774 71 792 57,979
338 ,227 98 875 81 972 78,434
485 ,826 119, 560 121 304 111,476
Source : EPB, Handbook of Korean Economy . 1980, p. 413
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Also, in Table 25, we see that those wages of professional,
technical, and managerial workers are greatly higher than those of sales
workers, farmers, fishery- related workers, and production workers.
2.9 Income Policies for Agricultural Sector
Since 1962, the main stress of the economic plan was to reduce the
share of the agricultural sector in the entire economy because the
agricultural sector had low productivity and low employment. So the
development of the agricultural sector did not appeal to economic
planners. As in most LDCs , the economic planners had an urban bias, even
if they proclaimed that reducing poverty in the rural sector was a matter
of high priority. 20 Although the Korean farm sector started from favorable
conditions in the late 1940s due to successful land reform, the
agricultural growth rate was far below the growth rate achieved by other
sectors. The rural sector played only the roles of providing urban areas
with a labor force and food without getting much benefit from economic
growth. In addition, the excessive money supply issued by government to
support the industrial sector induced inflation, which then reduced real
income in rural area. So as the gap between urban areas and rural areas
began to widen in the early 1970s, the government came to support the
rural sector with the grain management fund(GMF) and the fertilizer
fund(FF)
.
< Agricultural Dual Pricing System >
Under GMF the government purchased substantial stocks of grain in
the harvest season to support the producer price and then releases stocks
at a lower price in the off -harvest season. Therefore, a deficit is
inevitable in operating the GMF, a dual price system. The GMF deficit has
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been a substantial proportion of the total government expenditures from
3 percent to 10 percent over the years 1970 - 1981. The GMF deficit was
one of the major origins of excessive money supply, and made Korea's
inflation more severe
.
Under the dual grain price system, large farms received more
benefits than small farms because small farms did not have grains to sell
in the market. Table 26 shows that smaller farms possessing less than 1.2
acres of the crop land received less than the larger farms which possess
more than 2.5 acres in rice cash income. The smaller farms accounted for
33 percent the total farm households and the larger farms 32 percent. But
this price support program did not yield any benefit to households which
remained in rural area but did not carry on agriculture. On the contrary,
they suffered from inflation from the program.
Table 26. The Ratio of Rice Cash Income to Farm Household
Income by Farm Size
(Unit : Thousand won)
Year Farm Size in Acres
< 1.2 1.2 - 2.5 2.5 - 3.7 3.7 - 4.9 4.9 >
Farm Household
Income (A) ,1978
872
Rice Cash Income (B) 49
B/A (%) 5.6
1,192
171
14.3
1,651
337
20.4
2,162
551
25.5
2,293
1,054
35.2
Farm Household 3,094
Income (B) ,1984
Rice Cash Income (B) 184
B/A (%) 4.7
4,698 5,568 6,940 8,637
670 1,268 2,168 3,186
14.3 22.8 31 37
Source : Chung, C. Income Distribution and Economic Growth . Master Report
KSU, 1986, p. 63
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So although the dual grain price system generally increased the
income of rural households, it did not contribute to equality in income
distribution because of little share of the benefits for small farms and
non-agricultural households in rural area. Rather the GMF aggravated the
inequality of income in the agricultural sector.
< Subsidy for Fertilizer >
The government purchases fertilizer from the companies at a higher
price than it sells to farmers. Thus, a deficit in FF arises just as
in the case of GMF. In the subsidy for fertilizer, large farms also
received more benefits than small farms. As table 27 shows, the rural
farm, which cultivates less than 0.5 chungbo received a subsidy below the
average amount of subsidy, while the household which cultivates more than
1.0 chungbo received a subsidy above an average amount. Farmers who
possessed more than 2.0 chungbo received a subsidy of more than two times
as large as the average amount of subsidy.
Table 27. Subsidy for Fertilizer by Firm Size
(Chungbo, Won)
Year Average 0.5 < 0.5-1.0 1.0-1.5 1.5-2.0 2.0 >
1972 4,231 1,800 3,676 5,347 6,094 8,487
1973 5,113 1,969 4,081 6,563 8,382 11,089
1974 10,845 4,721 9,314 13,271 17.003 26,549
1975 23,508 9,519 20,058 28,535 36,559 56,396
1977 948 366 791 1,173 1,659 2,322
Source : Choo, Hackjung, Sources of Income Distribution
. Korea Development
Institute, 1979, Seoul, p. 164
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Since this subsidy provides more benefits to households of large farm
size, it made inequality of income distribution worse in the agricultural
sector.
< The New Village Movement >
The purpose of the "New Village Movement" (in Korean named "Saemaeul
Undong"), a comprehensive rural development program that was initiated by
Chunghee, Park, former Korean president in 1971, was to increase the
income of the rural sector. Under the influence of the new village
movement, a number of income generating programs were introduced, such as
increasing the cultivation of mushrooms, fruit and sericulture and
creation of part-time jobs under the Saemaeul factory program. Many of the
30 thousand villages designated as new villages succeeded in substantially
rasing their income levels, since the start of the movement.
Table 28. Growth Rate of Household Income
Annual Growth Rate , Percent
Period at Current Prices at 1970 Constant Prices
Farm Wage - Earner Farm Wage - Earner
1966-1970 20.7 22.2 5.3 9.2
1970-1974 25.0 15.2 6.5 1.5
1966-1974 22.9 18.6 5.9 5.3
Source : EPB, Industrial and Social Development Issues
. Korea Development
Institute, 1977, p. 232
But, Sunghwan Ban says 2 '* that although the movement improved the
environment of the community and increased incomes as shown in
Table 28, it had no effect on the equality of income distribution among
individual farm households
. Indeed inequality increased slightly, although
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not significantly (Table 29), because there was no material change in the
size distribution of landholdings among farms.
Table 29. Income Inequality of Farm Households (Gini Ratio)
Year 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Gini Ratio .2928 .2844 .2976 .2968 .3117 .2974 .3109 .3192
Source : Ban, Sunghwan, The New Village Movement . KDI , Seoul, 1977, p.
234
The movement could not keep going after 1980 due to : 1) shortage
of funds for supporting the movement; 2) the lack of specific knowledge
by farmers for selling products that were produced in the Saemaeul
factories; and 3) the unexpected death of former President Park who was
the leader of the movement.
3. The Fundamental Change of Strategy for Developing the Economy
(since 1981)
3.1 the Meaning of a Change in Economic Strategy
Since 1962, the basic strategy of economic development placed a
priority on growth rather than on distribution. So the growth-oriented
policy veiled its impact on income distribution. Although the government
made efforts to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor classes, the
results of that income-distribution policy were not satisfactory.
Since 1981 the economic environment has changed. The opinion that
the growth-oriented policy led by the government is no longer useful to
the Korean economy, has become a prominent one. The opinion indicated that
the Korean economy became too large for the government to control . They
argue that government intervention in the market will bring about the
distortion of the price mechanism. Popular opinion also suggested that the
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government should turn its attention from growth to distribution, so that
the benefit from growth spreads to the poor class
.
Thus, the Korean government made the fifth five-year economic
development plan. The government called the new five-year plan as the
Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan, whereas the previous
four five-year plans were just called Five-Year Economic Development
Plans. Unlike the previous four Five-Year Plans, which were mainly
concerned with industrial development, the Fifth Plan embodied a
fundamental change in policy direction. The government would play an
active role in social development to meet the basic needs of the people
and to pursue the idea of the welfare state. Government expenditures for
social development would be almost double those of the Fourth Plan.
Table 30. Government Expenditures for Social and Economic Development
( billion Won )
1977-1981 (A) 1982-1986 (B)
Amount Share Amount Share (B/A)
Total 29,891 100.1 43,481 100.0 1.5
Social Development 6,919 23.1
Housing 343 1.1
Education 5,067 17.0
Health & Social 734 2.5
Security
Water Supply 199 0.7 531 1.2 2.7
& Sewage
Others 576 1.8 900 2.0 1.6
Economic Development 6,690 22.4 8,223 18.9 1.2
Source : EPB, Economic and Social Development Plan . 1982, p. 117
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12,442 28.6 1.8
634 1.5 1.8
9,216 21.2 1.8
1,161 2.7 1.6
As shown in the Table 30, this increase implied that the share of
social development in total government expenditures rose from 23 percent
in the Fourth plan to 29 percent in the Fifth plan.
3.2 Enforcing Income Distribution Policy through Restraining
Economic Concentration
While the economic growth oriented policy was driven by the
government for two decades , huge firms , which played important roles in
developing the economy, have emerged. To protect primitive domestic
markets and to help domestic firms grow rapidly, the Korean government
provided a few firms with several types of supports, such as financial
assistance, high rates tariffs on imported products, and barriers to entry
for new firms
.
Consequently after twenty years, the domestic market has been under
the control of a few large firms. So, small firms faced difficult
conditions in their businesses. From table 31, we can discover that the
number of employees which the largest corporations hired declined
gradually, while their sales grew larger. This situation indicates that
economic concentration by the largest corporations does not increase
employment because they are likely to look for capital-intensive methods
while small corporations rely heavily on labor.
Thus excessive economic concentration is not desirable to income
distribution. From Tables 31 and 32 we can infer the fact that economic
concentration is one reason why inequality of income distribution grew in
the 1970s and early 1980s.
3 3
Table 31. Cumulative Ratio of Largest Corporation
(Manufacturing & Mining)
Amount of Sales Number of Employee
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Largest 13.9 12.3 12.7 15.9 16.3 2.1 2.0 1.5 1.5 2.3
5 Co.
Largest 18.3 17.1 17.4 20.1 20.8 4.2 5.3 4.6 4.3 3.4
10 Co.
Largest 34.7 34.1 33.7 36.4 36.6 14.1 14.9 13.6 13.6 12.4
50 Co.
Largest 45.0 43.6 43.1 46.3 46.2 20.8 20.8 20.6 19.4 19.1
100 Co.
Source : EPB, The White Paper on Anti - Trust Policy . 1984, p . 102
Table 32. Shift of Income Distribution
1965 1970 1976 1980
High income class 20 % 41.8 41.6 45.3 45.4
Middle income class 40 % 38.9 38.8 37.8 38.5
Low income class 40 % 19.3 19.6 16.9 16.1
Source : EPB, The White Paper on Anti-Trust Policy
. 1984, p. 103
In response, the Korean government has enforced the anti-trust law
to restrain excessive economic concentration. This law prohibits
anticompetitive mergers and does not allow huge corporations to emerge
through mergers. The law also watches the activities of large corporations
for securing small firms' business. In brief, enforcing the anti-trust law
is an effort to increase the equality of income distribution through
reforming the market structure.
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V. Summary and Conclusion
We have reviewed sources of income distribution and economic
policies affecting income distribution historically . In relation to income
distribution, Korea, unlike other LDCs , has a low inequality of income
distribution, although Korea and other LDCs had similar economic
situations in their earlier stages of establishment as newly independent
nations
.
As Havelmo indicates in his study, small differences between nations
in the beginning stage of development brought about great differences as
time passes. 1 Until the mid 1960s, the historical factors had strongly
affected income distribution in Korea. Such specific historical factors
had flattened the gap of income distribution between the high- income
classes and lower income classes. These specific historical factors are
as follows
.
First, during the Japanese colonial period, people could not
accumulate wealth and because of discrimination in education, Korea did
not have a chance to educate her people well, thus creating few human
resources at that time
.
Second, there were two land reforms. The goal of the first was to
primarily redistribute the government -owned and vested land. The goal of
the second was to redistribute the land owned by big farmers and absentee
landlords. Land reform played a decisive role in distributing income,
as Korea was mainly dependent on the agricultural sector in the late
1940s.
Third, besides returning lands possessed by the Japanese to the
Korean government, nonagricultural assets previously owned by Japanese
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were surrendered to the independent Korean government. These properties
were gradually disposed and sold to the private sector over a period of
more than a decade
.
Fourth, the damage and the destruction of the Korean War that swept
almost the entire area of the South, except the southeastern region,
further flattened wealth distribution. Besides, through this period of
war, some of the assets were transferred from the urban rich to the rural
poor for over-valued foodstuffs. But there were business opportunities for
profiteering during the war and the subsequent reconstruction period.
Fifth, in the early 1960s there was another confiscation of
illegally accumulated wealth by the military government. Despite a
substantial reduction in the initially assessed, most of the then
prominent Korean big businesses were affected. To some, it was fatal, and
the arrangement of usurious loans in the rural sector, together with
monetary reform, contributed to reduced inequality in income distribution.
All these historical reasons affected the distribution of assets,
reduced the relative share of income generated from them, and thus
improved the relative equity in income distribution. Land reform and the
decision of upper limit about ownership of farm land in the pre-
industrialized stage made great contribution to income distribution, from
the late 1940s through the early 1960s. There is some opinion that even
nowadays land reform is important, since land is one of several sources
that produce outputs. 2
There are other factors as follows.
First, there was an intensive enthusiasm for education.
In particular, after the Korean War, a boom of primary education
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contributed, to the development of labor-intensive industry in the 1960s.
Second, a high rate of economic growth created many employment
opportunities, which distributed income to many people in the form of
wages. The government, with economic growth, could collect financial
resources, which helped low- income classes. Economic development with
labor-intensive industry in the early 1960s absorbed many people who had
remained as disguised unemployed in the rural area. They migrated from
rural areas to urban areas. Then, due to the decrease in population in the
rural sector, the income of rural households increased compared with their
income before industrialization.
But after the early 1970s, the factors which contributed to income
distribution did not reduce income inequality anymore because of secondary
effects caused by growth-oriented economic policies.
First, to propel rapid economic growth, Korea provided some firms
with funds at a low interest rate. In this process, differences between
the low rate in the policy credit, and the higher interest rates in the
financial market gave great advantages to some firms. Since in Korea,
demand for money has been greater than the supply of money, receiving
policy credit, with the low rate, was a special benefit. With this policy
credit, the beneficiaries created much economic surplus compared to non-
beneficiaries. So, gradually, the firms, under the favor of government,
grew to large corporations in short-term periods.
Second, in the process of rapid economic growth, because many people
migrated from rural areas to urban areas, shortages of housing occurred
in the urban area. So, as the price of housing and housing rent soared,
people who owned housing got rich, while people without housing faced the
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heavy burden caused by skyrocketing rent. Some firms, which already had
real assets, including building and factory sites, gained enormous capital
surplus without any economic activity. This situation accelerated the
economic concentration of wealth and income. Housing owners compensated
for inflation by increasing rents. So owing to inflation, the poor classes
became worse, while the rich classes became betteroff.
Third, the poor class did not get sufficient higher education to get
highly-skilled jobs. In Korea, where most corporations require applicants
for management jobs to graduate from college, children from high-income
classes are more likely to attend top-ranking colleges through out-of-
school studies in addition to regular class studies. Because out-of -school
studies, which require special tutors, is very expensive for the lower
class, it is not easy for students from low- income class to attend top-
ranking colleges , to say nothing of the high tuition and fees needed in
attending the college.
Consequently, the students of low- income classes do not have much
chance to go to college. Thus income opportunities are likely to be
transmitted from generation to generation.
Fourth, there exists a large gap in income between the urban and
the rural areas. Of course, there are some policies such as dual
agricultural pricing system and the new village movement to support the
rural sector. With the aid of such policies, the income gap was reduced
substantially around 1974, but from the late 1970s the gap began to widen
again, due to high inflation that induced increases in the wage of urban
workers, while the income of rural households remained almost as before.
Even when the income of rural households increased, the increasing rate
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was small compared to the rate of urban households.
Fifth, the gap between the largest corporation and small-and medium-
sized corporations became great. The firms which participated in
industries fostered by government grew into large corporations, whereas
some firms which could not join these industries grew more slowly. Some
of the big corporations established business kingdoms by means of
conglomerate erger , and their sales almost reached the same size as the
ones of world-wide companies.
< Conclusion >
Because we have discussed problems that originated from the sources of
inequality of income distribution in section IV, we can understand what
kind of steps should be taken in relation to income distribution policies
in the future. Therefore, this paper will not mention in detail the
policies to be taken here. Instead, this paper will introduce some
policies focusing on satisfying the basic needs of Koreans.
First, serious housing shortages in urban areas are a major problem.
In Korea, housing is evaluated as a symbol of stable life. When someone
earns money, he usually purchases his own housing. So the fact that the
rate of ownership of housing decreased and the portion of housing
expenditure became large, with economic growth indicates that the poor
class's basic needs of housing declined. Government, therefore, should
provided the poor classes with a small-sized apartment which they can
afford to buy or rent. The government should also restrain with tax
policy, the construction of large-sized apartments and luxury housing,
which were used as tools of speculation among rich people.
Second, due to Confucianism, Korean parents traditionally have
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strong concerns about the education of their children. Even if they are
poor, if their children are excellent in scholastic ability and attend
top-ranking schools, they find their lives worth living. The poorer they
are in the present time, the greater the concern about the well-being of
their children in the future. If their children cannot get higher
education for financial reasons, they become discouraged.
Nowadays, Seoul, the capital of Korea, has difficulty with the excessive
inflow of population. The ultimate reason for population concentration is
that parents want their children to enter top-ranking universities in
Seoul. Thus government should provide the poor classes with subsidies for
educational expenses, especially since government supports the private
education system financially through the reduction and exemption of taxes,
and the introduction of special admission system for students who donates
funds to school so that the private school can reduce tuition and fees
.
Third, the wage gap caused by academic training should be
eliminated. In Korea, the salary of employees who are in charge of
managerial type jobs is higher than that of employees whose positions are
production workers. That is, the wages of white-collar workers are much
higher than those of blue-collar workers, no matter what the job entails.
That is why the entrance examination for college is highly competitive in
Korea. The student who gave up entering college because of financial
problems and entered vocational school instead receives a low wage
compared to the student who graduated from college.
Fourth, the government should provide the poor classes with
sufficient medical service. Members of the poor classes can not buy
medical insurance because they can not afford to pay insurance fees. But
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medical care insurance is more essential to the poor classes because of
their financial problems. With sufficient quality medical service, infant
mortality rate can be reduced, and life expectancy can be extended.
Fifth, small-and medium-sized corporations should be protected. The
economic policies that treated large corporations preferentially to attain
an economic scale should cease. Equity is as important as efficiency. As
this paper mentioned earlier, small-and medium-sized corporations create
more employment per unit of capital than large corporations.
The government should watch the market so that game is played on the
basis of the principle of competition. And if abuse of market power by
larger corporations occur, government should correct this unfair trade so
that small-sized corporations can survive.
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Korea is considered one of countries which have a low inequality in
income distribution. A low inequality in Korea's income distribution is
not due to the Korean government's policies but historical and cultural
factors. During the Japanese colonial period, Korean could not accumulated
wealth. Two land reforms redistributed the government- and big farmers-
owned lands to small farmers. The damage and the destruction of the Korean
War flattened wealth distribution. Confiscation of illegally accumulated
wealth by the military government contributed to low education and a high
rate of economic growth reduced the gap between the high- income and low-
income classes.
This paper focuses on finding out why the favorable historical
factors on income distribution have been veiled by growth- oriented
economic policies . To propel rapid economic growth , Korea provided some
firms with funds at a low interest rate. In this process, differences
between the low rate in the policy credit and the higher interest in the
financial market gave great advantage to some firms. The price of housing
and housing rent soared in the process of rapid economic growth, because
many people migrated from rural areas to urban areas. The poor class did
not get sufficient higher education due to expensive tuition and fee. The
unbalanced growth strategy emphasized manufacturing sector rather than
agriculture. So there exists a large gap in income between the urban and
the rural areas. The firms which participated in industries fostered by
government grew into large corporation, whereas some firms which could not
join these industries grew more slowly. Thus the gap between the largest
corporation and small-and medium-sized corporations became great.
This paper introduces some policies focusing on satisfying the basic
needs of Korea.
The government should provided the poor classes with a small-sized
apartment. The government should provided the poor classes with subsides
for educational expenses , including supporting the private school . The
wage gap caused by academic training should be eliminated. The poor
classes should be easily accessible to sufficient medical services. Small-
and medium-sized corporations should be protected. The economic policies
that treated large corporations preferentially to attain an economic scale
should cease.
